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Over the past 15 years, the world has experienced a rebirth of international criminal law. The first interna-tional courts since the close of the Second World War, 
the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY) paved the way for hybrid courts. 
The 2002 establishment of a permanent International Criminal 
Court (ICC) demonstrates that international criminal law will be 
a feature of the international legal landscape indefinitely. 
The work of the ICTY and ICTR has given rise to much 
scholarship. This article examines one branch of this scholar-
ship—criticism of international sentencing. The article lays out 
critiques, which are not without merit, but responds that these 
critiques are overstated and misplaced as they undervalue the 
importance of aggravating and mitigating factors and rely on 
a flawed analogy between domestic and international criminal 
law. The article then turns to the ICC with these criticisms in 
mind, and concludes that the ICC’s guidance on penalties could 
lead that Court to take a more precise approach, improving inter-
national sentencing practice. 
internationaL sentenCing
Punishing human rights violations with penalties proportion-
ate to the gravity of their crimes has become a norm of interna-
tional law.1 The penalties provisions of the agreements creating 
the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC reflect this norm.2 The ICTY and 
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ICTR, however, operate with scant additional formal guidance, 
causing sentencing practice at these two most established inter-
national courts to appear unsupported, confused, and cluttered. 
penaLties that refLeCt gravity
The appropriate punishment for serious human rights viola-
tions, including international crimes, is a term of imprisonment 
commensurate with the gravity of the crime. International crimi-
nal law began reflecting this proportionality following World 
War II and continues to do so. The statutes creating the ICTY, 
ICTR, and ICC call on each court to consider the “gravity” of 
the crime in determining an appropriate penalty.3 
International law provides little further guidance on proper 
sentencing for international crimes. This relative lack of guid-
ance springs from the fact that international crimes have gone 
largely unprosecuted and unpunished. Also, most human rights 
crimes that are prosecuted are heard by national courts; thus, 
domestic systems handle sentencing, employing their own crite-
ria. Finally, fostering agreement between states on why and how 
to punish is extremely difficult.
sentenCing at the iCty and iCtr
The formal sentencing guidance of the ICTY and ICTR is 
nearly identical. The tribunals must issue prison sentences. To 
determine appropriate sentences, tribunals should impose penal-
ties that reflect the gravity of the crime, while considering “the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.” They may 
also look to “practice regarding prison sentences” in the state 
where the crimes were committed.4 The tribunals’ Rules of 
Evidence and Procedure contain additional provisions, but again 
guidance is scant. The Rules allow consideration of aggravat-
ing and mitigating “circumstances” but do not offer definitions 
other than to characterize “substantial cooperation with the 
Prosecutor” as mitigating.5 
Sentencing appears to vary greatly as a result of these brief 
provisions. Decisions typically account for a crime’s grav-
ity, many even explicitly invoke proportionality.6 Yet despite 
employing identical provisions on gravity’s role, the tribunals 
have approached its determination differently. The ICTR deter-
mines the gravity of a crime based on its inherent elements, 
invoking a partial hierarchy under which genocide is most seri-
ous.7 The ICTY, however, approaches the question subjectively, 
allowing the context of the crime and the convicted to enter the 
determination.8
Emphasis on gravity suggests that retribution is the major 
theoretical underpinning behind international punishment, but 
the tribunals also consider other theories. They often look to 
deterrence, particularly general deterrence.9 Other theories 
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Rehabilitation is sometimes a consideration.10 As in domestic 
systems, the impact of these theories on resulting sentences 
remains unclear. 
In practice, ICTY and ICTR sentencing relies heavily on 
evaluating aggravating and mitigating circumstances. With 
little guidance on these factors, the jurisprudence defines which 
circumstances to consider and what these circumstances are. 
Aggravating circumstances include the position of the convicted; 
his or her degree of involvement in the crime; premeditation; 
the nature of the act; and the victims’ status and vulnerability. 
Mitigating circumstances include entering a guilty plea; display-
ing remorse; acting under duress; surrendering voluntarily; and 
the convicted’s age and personal circumstances.11 
Although the Rules guide both tribunals to consider domestic 
sentencing regimes of the respective states,12 the tribunals have 
made little use of this provision. Jurisprudence makes clear that 
domestic practice does not bind tribunal judges. This determina-
tion removes the difficulty of interpreting how to incorporate 
Rwanda’s and former Yugoslav republics’ use of capital pun-
ishment into modern international criminal law, which prohibits 
the practice.13 
CritiCisM of internationaL sentenCing
Against this background, observers have written much about 
international sentencing’s deficiencies. Most criticism starts 
from the premise that international sentencing criteria are lim-
ited and underdeveloped. At the root of the criticism is concern 
that international penalties do not adequately reflect the gravity 
of the crimes, either because international courts inconsistently 
punish similar crimes14 or because they are per se lenient.15 
The extreme gravity of international crimes only heightens this 
concern.
International sentencing’s critics are comprised of practitio-
ners and academics of varying nationalities. Their criticism falls 
into two categories. First, observers criticize the ICTY and ICTR 
for lacking a coherent theory of punishment.16 Although consid-
eration of gravity suggests a retributive theory, the Statutes—
particularly their reference to “individual circumstances”—raise 
alternate theories. The tribunals’ jurisprudence has fueled criti-
cism by seemingly relying on every potential theory of punish-
ment at different points. 
Second, observers criticize the tribunals for not developing 
or inconsistently applying a hierarchy of crimes.17 The absence 
of a hierarchy complicates the ability to penalize in a manner 
commensurate with gravity. This critique questions the use of 
“individual circumstances.” Some judges interpret “individual 
circumstances of the convicted” as an element contributing to a 
crime’s gravity—the circumstances of the crime and the crimi-
nal can heighten or lessen the gravity of the crime itself. Others 
interpret this wording to mean that crimes have inherent grav-
ity, independent of subjective circumstances. This split mirrors 
the difference between the ICTY’s and ICTR’s approaches to 
determining gravity.
Both of these critiques lead scholars to the same conclusions: 
the ICTY and ICTR issue inconsistent, and often, unduly lenient 
sentences. Purported leniency, however, appears to resonate 
particularly strongly.18 For this reason, no case draws greater 
criticism than Prosecutor v. Erdemovic ́ . 
Drazen Erdemovic ́ , a young, low-level soldier charged with 
war crimes and crimes against humanity for participating in a 
massacre, estimated that he shot 70 men.19 Erdemovic ́  initially 
pled guilty to the higher of his charges, causing some judges 
to conclude that he was ill-informed, prompting rehearing.20 
He then pled to the lower charge and received a five-year sen-
tence.21 
Reconciling this outcome is difficult for some  observers. 
Critics, however, misunderstand Erdemovic ́ . Numerous miti-
gating factors, including duress and cooperation with the 
Prosecutor, are the major reason behind his brief sentence.22 The 
outcome is also an anomaly. Erdemovic ́ ’s sentence remains the 
ICTY’s second shortest. 
Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding Erdemovic ́  
clearly influenced his sentence. His initial trial produced the 
ICTY’s first sentencing judgment. Judges were struggling with 
new, vague sentencing criteria, striving to issue an appropri-
ate sentence with uncertainty in the future docket. Facing the 
prospect of trying high-level leaders accused of orchestrating 
larger-scale massacres, judges may not have wanted to heavily 
penalize Erdemovic ́. Doing so would have reduced the tribunal’s 
ability to maneuver on sentencing in later cases. If consistency 
is measured by relative sentence length, a high sentence would 
set a benchmark, committing the tribunal to long sentences in 
all cases.23 Judges were also likely concerned with perceived 
fairness. Issuing its inaugural sentence against a defendant 
who appeared ill-informed would subject defense structures to 
criticism, upsetting a major underpinning of human rights and 
justice and calling the tribunal’s fairness into question. 
Criticism of Erdemovic ́  aside, observers correctly argue 
that lack of uniformity and seeming leniency of sentencing are 
inconsistent with the norm of issuing penalties commensurate 
[I]nconsistency and leniency are not the fatal flaws  
that critics purport. In practice, the tribunals’  
sentences are more consistent, more punitive, and more  
in accordance with gravity than critics suggest.
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with gravity. Dissimilar sentences in like cases and lenient 
penalties for serious violations also raise questions of court bias 
and risk international justice’s credibility. These concerns cause 
some critics to declare that the ICTY and ICTR have contributed 
little to sentencing that might guide the ICC.24 
responding to CritiCs
Although critics are correct that the tribunals lack a uniform 
theory of punishment and have split on the question of inher-
ent gravity, these attributes are not the root cause of sentence 
variation or short sentences. Furthermore, inconsistency and 
leniency are not the fatal flaws that critics purport. In practice, 
the tribunals’ sentences are more consistent, more punitive, 
and more in accordance with gravity than critics suggest.25 The 
leniency criticism is rooted in an imprecise, impractical analogy 
between international and domestic criminal law. In fact, case 
law shows that sentences generally fall within specific ranges, 
dictated by the crimes, and that these ranges vary appropriately 
with the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
The aspects of sentencing that critics find problematic are sim-
ply a reflection of individualized sentencing, achieved through 
the application of these circumstances.
variety resuLts froM aggravating and  
Mitigating CirCuMstanCes
ICTY and ICTR sentencing criteria inevitably lead to some 
inconsistency. This result is due more to extensive employment 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, than to elements 
on which critics focus. The consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances is important to preserving individual-
ized sentences and should not be eliminated. Modern criminal 
law, both internationally and in general, favors individualiza-
tion.26  
Adding a clearly articulated, overarching theory of punish-
ment to the tribunals’ vague sentencing guidelines will not lead 
to consistent results.27 The effect that theories have on sentences 
length remains unclear, both in international and domestic con-
texts. Moreover, getting international judges to agree on one or 
even several theories will be difficult.28 The most that a coher-
ent theory of punishment can do is reiterate the importance of 
gravity in sentencing or, alternately, emphasize another purpose 
of punishment. 
Furthermore, multiple theories of punishment working simul-
taneously do not inevitably lead to inconsistent results. One 
gauges consistency by the sentences, not how judges reach their 
conclusions: judges weigh factors differently, but ultimately, it 
is the sentence itself that matters.29 A single theory might guide 
judges, but it alone cannot achieve consistency.
Similarly, a hierarchy of crimes alone cannot make sentenc-
ing consistent. Courts would need to agree that gravity comes 
from the crime itself, comprised solely of its elements. Although 
such an inter-court agreement might be achievable and could 
encourage consistency, tribunals still act under a framework 
in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances shape sen-
tences. The ICTR employs a partial inherent gravity approach, 
but its sentences still vary, even when issued for the same 
crime.30 Conversely, if courts chose to employ a contextual 
determination of gravity, ranking it will remain as difficult and 
have as little effect as in current ICTY practice. 
Dismissing these two hypothesized causes of international 
sentencing’s problems leaves another possible source—the use 
of aggravating and mitigating factors. Critics have been less 
willing to point a finger at this aspect of the sentencing scheme, 
possibly because it is a common and valued feature of many 
domestic systems. Aggravating and particularly mitigating 
circumstances, however, have strong influence on the ultimate 
sentencing determinations of the tribunals. 
inConsistenCy in sentenCing is Myth
International sentences are not as divergent as some critics 
suggest. Although the tribunals’ sentences vary, case law dem-
onstrates they typically fall within certain ranges. As one ICTR 
judgment notes, although “awarding a single sentence” for mul-
tiple crimes complicates the ability to determine the range of 
sentences issued for specific crimes, one can “ascertain general 
ranges” useful to consider in future cases. The ICTR went on to 
discuss typical penalties at the ICTY and ICTR. “[P]erpetrators 
convicted of . . . genocide or extermination as a crime against 
humanity” typically receive sentences “ranging from fifteen 
years’ . . . to life imprisonment.” As crimes against humanity, 
rape generally results in 12- to 15-year sentences; torture, five 
to 12 years; and murder, 12 to 20 years.31 
These ranges are not particularly varied. In fact, they vary 
less than sentences in many domestic systems. In some cases, 
international penalties are lighter than domestic sentences. 
Perceived leniency aside, however, viewing ICTY and ICTR 
sentencing decisions collectively as an independent body of 
jurisprudence, the sentences associated with each crime fall into 
rather narrow ranges that vary, as in most systems, with the pres-
ence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 
the LenienCy Critique is fLawed
The more impassioned critique of international sentencing is 
that sentences are unduly lenient. Objectively, however, ICTY 
and ICTR jurisprudence is not as lenient as critics suggest. 
Rather, the tribunals routinely hand down long prison sentences. 
A 2002 study showed that the majority of those convicted by the 
ICTR were serving life sentences, and that the mean sentence at 
the ICTY was 16 years.32 Furthermore, the ICTY has handed 
down a significant number of sentences exceeding 16 years.33 
The ICTR’s non-life sentences are also lengthy, with a number 
exceeding 20 years.34 
Conversely, application of mitigating circumstances often 
reduces sentence lengths. This is the intended and appropri-
ate role of these circumstances, however, in international and 
domestic law. The tribunals, especially the ICTY, have issued 
a number of sentences in the seven to twelve year range, even 
for relatively serious offenses, largely because of these circum-
stances.35 
Underlying the leniency criticism is a misplaced comparison 
between domestic and international sentencing. More properly 
stated, the critique is not that international sentencing is lenient, 
but that it is lenient relative to domestic practice. There is some 
truth to this argument: international sentences are shorter than 
sentences in some national systems, but this is not true univer-
sally.36 
The leniency criticism is also flawed more fundamentally. 
Comparing international and domestic sentencing is inappropri-
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ate. The international criminal system is not a national system 
operating supra-nationally. International criminal law is dis-
tinct from its domestic counterpart. Murder as a crime against 
humanity differs from murder; rape as a war crime includes dif-
ferent elements from those in domestic definitions.37 For proper 
perspective, international sentences must be examined relative 
to one another rather than relative to domestic sentences. In 
this light, international sentences are typically stringent, even 
in cases with numerous mitigating circumstances.38 When the 
tribunals have issued short sentences, extenuating circumstances 
were at work. 
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC’s Rules of Evidence 
and Procedure offer significant additional guidance on sentenc-
ing. Rule 145 instructs judges to consider 12 enumerated “fac-
tors,” and then “balance all the relevant factors” to develop a 
sentence that, in “totality[,] . . . reflect[s] . . . culpability. . . .” 
The Rule also contains lists of mitigating and aggravating “cir-
cumstances.” The lists of “factors” and “circumstances” include 
information relevant both to the facts of the crime and the 
convicted, although neither list is exhaustive. Finally, Rule 145 
elaborates that the “existence of one or more aggravating cir-
cumstances” may be sufficient to impose life imprisonment. 44
Can the iCC iMprove internationaL sentenCing?
The ICC’s sentencing guidance remains relatively unex-
plored in scholarship. Addressing this gap is important, but it 
makes analyzing the guidance challenging, and makes consider-
ing potential approaches to sentencing speculative. The ICC’s 
more detailed guidance is an achievement. Because the Rome 
Statute strives to create a uniform, universal system of penal-
ization, drafting these provisions required compromise. Those 
involved manifested their interest in improving the precision of 
international sentencing. The improved guidance suggests that 
sentencing decisions will be more understandable and grounded 
than those of previous courts. If ICC judges follow the drafters’ 
lead, they will also attempt greater precision. 
Without case law to test this prediction, one must turn to a 
hypothetical. Erdemovic ́ provides an apt example. If the ICC 
were to hear Erdemovic ́, it would begin from an advantaged 
perspective. For example, Rule 145 establishes duress as a miti-
gating circumstance, whereas ICTY judges made this determi-
nation. Additionally, the ICC Rules suggest that remorse, a miti-
gating circumstance that the ICTY recognizes, is an  appropriate 
mitigating circumstance. In short, the ICC’s guidance suggests 
that ICC and ICTY judges would agree on  Erdemovic ́’s major 
mitigating circumstances. ICC judges could also more easily 
recognize certain aggravating factors in Erdemovic ́, such as the 
large number and vulnerability of victims, and discriminatory 
motive. Interestingly, because aggravating factors exist, the ICC 
Rules would allow the Court to consider life imprisonment, indi-
cating that judges might consider a longer sentence. 
Although the ICC’s additional guidance could simplify 
judges’ work, it still endows judges with significant discretion 
over sentencing, thus failing to address inconsistency critiques. 
Three issues present questions. First, the ICC Rules call for the 
Court to “balance” aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
with other “factors,” but do not provide any guidance on relative 
weight of these considerations or how to conduct this balancing. 
Whether Erdemovic ́’s duress, cooperation, and remorse would 
outweigh aggravating circumstances is an open question. Second, 
the ICC’s lists of mitigating and aggravating circumstances are 
non-exhaustive. It remains uncertain whether mitigating cir-
cumstances that the ICTY considered, such as Erdemovic’s age 
and family situation, would be relevant. Finally, the role that 
the “factors” play in sentencing is unclear. The listed factors 
relate to both the crime and the convicted. They are also not 
conclusively mitigating or aggravating.45 Rather, they seem to 
comprise a list of umbrella considerations for judges seeking to 
define additional, non-enumerated aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. Judges might consider these issues in striving to 
improve sentencing precision. 
Selectively looking to 
ICTY and ICTR practice 
could help the ICC answer 
these open questions, while 
avoiding past pitfalls and 
working to strengthen 
sentencing practice.
Furthermore, from a practical standpoint, international courts 
cannot account for domestic law in sentencing. With so many 
states involved, it is extremely difficult to reach agreement. If 
ICC judges were concerned about sentences seeming lenient 
relative to domestic law, they would either have to examine 
domestic law in each case or resort to the strictest penal law 
of all member states. The Rome Statute appears to prohibit the 
first scenario.39 Its application would sacrifice sentencing con-
sistency, causing the ICC to fail to create a uniform penalties 
regime.40 The second scenario creates distressing results: the 
harshest (even disfavored) penal systems would set the interna-
tional standard.    
Looking forward:  
the proMise of the iCC
The ICC’s formal guidance on sentencing is more extensive 
than that of the ICTY or ICTR, but it remains untested. The 
Rome Statute’s penalties provisions resemble those in the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes. The “gravity of the crime” and the “indi-
vidual circumstances of the convicted person” are the two main 
considerations.41 Due to the ICC’s worldwide jurisdiction, the 
Rome Statute does not provide recourse to national practice.42 In 
an effort to increase certainty in penalization, the Rome Statute 
elaborates on sentence length. It caps imprisonment at 30 years 
but permits life imprisonment “when justified by the extreme 
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person.”43 
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reCoMMendations:  
past praCtiCe as guidanCe
Selectively looking to ICTY and ICTR practice could help 
the ICC answer these open questions, while avoiding past pit-
falls and working to strengthen sentencing practice. Although 
the ICC has held that it will not simply “import” the practice 
of the ICTY and ICTR, its judges can learn from these prede-
cessors.46 Judges can choose to absorb certain practices while 
circumventing problematic aspects. Selectivity will help the 
ICC create a uniform penalties regime that represents develop-
ment in international sentencing, while avoiding confusion and 
inconsistency that would come with endorsing all international 
jurisprudence. 
For the ICC to develop credibility and legitimacy, well-
defined criteria on what constitutes an aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstance and how these circumstances affect sentence 
length are necessary. ICC judges, however, might hesitate to 
establish guidelines that limit judicial discretion.47 Therefore, 
the following recommendations are intentionally broad. 
exaMine sentenCing ranges and effeCt of 
aggravating and Mitigating CirCuMstanCes
ICC judges should examine the range of sentences that the 
tribunals have issued for analogous cases. Examining single 
cases will rarely be helpful. Given the ICC’s “message of rela-
tive clemency,”48 looking to ranges of ICTY sentences—which 
are typically lighter—may be useful. ICTR case law may also 
guide judges, specifically in determining when “extreme grav-
ity” warrants life imprisonment.49 
The importance of individualized sentencing makes examin-
ing ranges essential. Sentencing ranges can elucidate how ICC 
judges might appropriately “balance” sentencing factors and 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Because aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances are the primary reason for sentence 
variety, they are largely responsible for the existence of ranges. 
By looking to these ranges, judges can observe the weight that 
circumstances carry and their effect on sentences. Given the ICC 
Rules’ instruction that judges consider “circumstances . . . of 
the convicted . . . and of the crime” and additional “factors,” the 
ICTY’s contextual case law might be particularly helpful. 
preCiseLy define aggravating and Mitigating 
CirCuMstanCes and CLarify effeCts on sentenCes
ICC judges should strive to define aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances precisely, and better articulate their applica-
tion. Given the numerous, diverse states involved with the ICC, 
the likelihood that members or judges will agree upon a theory 
of punishment is low. Clarifying the definition and significance 
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, however, is a 
major and achievable step toward improving international sen-
tencing’s flaws. Clearer jurisprudence on these topics will allow 
the ICC to develop international sentencing coherently, while 
preserving judicial discretion.
Despite the advantages of clearer formal guidance and the 
ability to examine past practice, the Rome Statute and the 
ICC Rules leave open significant questions about the role and 
relevance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and of 
the additional sentencing “factors.” The named factors might 
help judges define additional aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances, and articulate them with greater precision. ICC 
judges may wish to consider certain aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances that are well-established in ICTY and ICTR 
jurisprudence and suggested by the ICC Rules. These include 
leadership role or high position, humiliating nature of the crime, 
and remorse. 
The tribunals’ jurisprudence also offers guidelines on the 
weight that these circumstances carry. For example, case law 
often describes which mitigating circumstances warrant substan-
tial reductions in sentence versus those that have little impact.50 
ICC judges should make similar determinations. 
ConCLusion
Current international sentencing practice is not without 
flaws. Given the early stage of development of the field, flaws 
are understandable, but are also less severe than scholarship 
suggests. The ICC has the potential to improve international 
sentencing practice, and will undertake its early sentencing 
judgments with more precise guidance than its predecessors did, 
benefitting from the experience of the ICTY and ICTR. The ICC 
judges would be wise not to approach sentencing from within 
the vacuum of the Rome Statute and the ICC Rules, but instead 
to draw on past experience. This approach will help develop 
international sentencing and improve international criminal law 
as whole.  HRB
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19 See Prosecutor v. Erdemović, ICTY, Case No. IT-96-22, Indict-
ment, ¶¶ 11-12, May 29, 1996, available at http://www.un.org/icty/
indictment/english/erd-ii960529e.htm; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, 
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